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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS MET THE MARSHALLING 
REQUIREMENT REGARDING EACH OF HIS CLAIMS. 
A. Sufficiency of the evidence. 
Appellant has presented the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, in accordance with the long-standing rules of this court. See United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 140P.3d 
1200 (Utah 2006). In doing so, Appellant has done more than merely 
"provide an exhaustive review of all the evidence presented at trial/' per the 
requirements enumerated in Park City Mines. Id. at 1207 (citation omitted). 
Appellant has also "demonstrate[d] how the court found the facts from the 
evidence and then explained] why those findings contradict the clear weight 
of the evidence." Id. 
Appellant begins his opening brief with an exhaustive statement of the 
facts presented at trial, including all facts supporting the findings of the jury. 
(Appellant's Brief, 3-19.) Appellant also reviews these facts in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. (Appellant's Brief, 3-24.) 
Without eviscerating his argument, Appellant now recalls for this 
Court his marshaling of some particularly damning facts against him. For 
instance, and without reciting all the facts in Appellant's Brief, Appellant 
acknowledges that, although he didn't remember having his finger on the 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trigger when the shotgun fired, "I must have [had my finger on the trigger.]" 
(Appellant's Brief, 6-7.) Appellant also acknowledges Detective Coleman's 
testimony as to what Appellant told the detective in the aftermath of the 
shooting. Appellant and the victim were arguing: "[A]t that point 
[Appellant] describes stepping back and picking up the gun. ... [T]hat's 
when he pulled the trigger." (Appellant's Brief, 8.) Appellant also notes 
Detective Coleman's quotation of Appellant on the night of the shooting: "I 
think I just pulled her around. And she, what do you gotta do? It was just 
like that and bam, it was over." (Appellant's Brief, 8). Appellant points out 
in his brief that he agreed with the prosecutor's assertion that he knew the 
danger his shotgun presented, that he pointed the gun toward the bathroom 
where he knew the victim to be, and that he "wasn't paying attention" to the 
victim. (Appellant's Brief, 9.) Appellant also acknowledges in his brief 
Detective Coleman's testimony that Appellant was telling a different version 
of events at trial than he had when interviewed by Detective Coleman in the 
immediate aftermath of the shooting. (Appellant's Brief, 9). Appellant also 
acknowledges he told a 9-1-1 dispatcher he "just killed [his] girlfriend," that 
he "shot her with a shotgun," and that he "can't even believe how [he] pulled 
the trigger." (Appellant's Brief, 10.) Appellant reminds this Court that he 
admitted to Officer McCarthy, "I can't believe I killed [the victim] ... I 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
killed her." (Appellant's Brief, 13.) Appellant also acknowledges Detective 
Coleman's testimony that Appellant told him Appellant "could not justify 
his actions and what he had done." (Appellant's Brief, 17.) And although 
Appellant seeks to classify the shooting as "drunken stupidity," he also 
acknowledges that various police officers, and even his long-time friend who 
knew him well, all testified that he did not seem to be intoxicated when they 
spoke to him or otherwise observed his behavior. (Appellant's Brief, 15-18.) 
Finally, Appellant's marshaling of the facts unfavorable to his argument 
includes the acknowledgement his shotgun was tested sometime after the 
shooting, and that it could not be made to fire without pulling the trigger, 
and did not seem to have what Detective Coleman would call a "hair 
trigger." (Appellant's Brief, 19.) 
Appellant then contrasts those facts with the findings from a similar 
case, State v. Robinson, 63 P.3d 105 (Utah App. 2003), although noting for 
this Court that the facts in Robinson were "admittedly less well developed 
than in Appellant's trial." (Appellant's Brief, 23.) Appellant also 
acknowledges in his brief to this Court that "Detective Coleman believed 
Appellant was saying 'he fired the gun intentionally.' " And, Appellant 
marshals a number of facts contrary to his argument: that he had loaded a 
shell into the gun earlier in the evening, before that victim came home, that 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he was arguing with the victim at the time of the shooting, and that he was 
angry when the gun fired. (Appellant's brief, 26-27.) 
After his exhaustive marshaling of the evidence against him, 
Appellant then explains why the jury's verdict contradicts the clear weight 
of this evidence. See Park City Mines, at 1207. Without completely 
restating his argument, Appellant now notes he argued the evidence against 
him was insufficient to support the jury's verdict because the evidence did 
not support a Finding that Appellant acted recklessly on the night of the 
shooting. 
Appellant begins by acknowledging the difficulties in such an appeal: 
"We will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if we 
determine that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict'." State 
v. Workman, 122 P.3d 639, 645 (Utah 2005) (citations omitted). Appellant 
then notes: 
A person acts recklessly "when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." 
Appellant's Brief at 22 (citing Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-103(3) (1999)). 
Appellant points out he had been drinking beer all day leading up to the 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shooting, that he had chambered a shell earlier in the day while 
contemplating suicide, that when the victim came home he had forgotten he 
had chambered a round, and, when the gun fired, he was trying to be sure the 
gun was safe by checking the chamber. Appellant reminds this Court he 
testified he did not remember consciously pulling the trigger, and that he 
was not aiming the gun, nor trying to fire the gun when it did fire. Appellant 
also reminds this Court he told the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Officer McCarthy and 
Detective Coleman the shooting was unintentional, an accident. Appellant 
points out his extreme distress over this accident, and that he feels 
responsible for causing the death of the victim. But Appellant argues his 
responsibility is limited to his negligence, that he should have been aware of 
the risk he was taking, not that he actually was aware of the risk. Appellant 
argues that because he was too drunk to appreciate the risk he was taking 
when handling the shotgun in the presence of the victim, he could not 
consciously disregard that risk.1 
Appellant concludes reasonable minds simply could not have reached 
a verdict of manslaughter. (Appellant's Brief, 21-29.) 
1
 As the State points out in its brief, the degree of intoxication is but one of 
many factors a court may consider in determining whether a defendant was 
reckless or criminally negligent. Here, it is the critical factor which explains 
Appellant's lack of awareness of the risks he was taking. See Brief of 
Appellee at 30, citing State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah 1985). 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, it is worth noting that even in the dire circumstances where an 
appellant has failed to meet the marshaling requirement, this Court is not 
precluded from addressing the merits of Appellant's claims. A failure to 
marshal evidence may be relied on in such draconian manner, but it is not 
required. See, Park City Mines, at 1207. The procedural posture of this case 
makes it one in which this Court will want to address on the merits of 
Appellant's claims. Appellant was convicted at trial in June of 2003. 
Appellant has sought an appeal ever since, eventually filing pro se in " 
January, 2009, a document he called a Petition for Review. This Court 
treated that filing as a Petition for Extraordinary Writ. When that Petition 
was denied, Appellant eventually obtained and prevailed at a Manning 
hearing in December, 2009. Timely notice was filed more than six-and-one-
half years after his conviction, and this appeal ensued. Appellant now awaits 
a hearing of the issues he has raised on appeal. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 
Likewise, in regards to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Appellant has complied with the marshaling required of him by presenting 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. See Park City Mines. 
And, Appellant has done more than merely "provide an exhaustive review of 
all the evidence presented at trial." Id. Appellant has also "demonstrate^] 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explained] why 
those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. 
As previously noted, Appellant begins his opening brief with an 
exhaustive statement of the facts presented at trial, including all facts 
supporting the findings of the jury. (Appellant's Brief, 3-19.) Appellant also 
reviews these facts in evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
(Appellant's Brief, 3-19 and 30-35.) 
Among the facts marshaled by Appellant is the exclamation, "I just 
blew her face right off!" (Appellant's Brief, 10.) He also acknowledges the 
testimony of the medical examiner, who estimated the shotgun when fired 
was in front of the victim and off to the victim's right, and that the muzzle of 
the shotgun was within three or four feet of the victim at the time of the 
shooting. (Appellant's Brief, 19.) Appellant also notes the gruesome details 
of the medical examiner's testimony, what she described to the jury as 
"exploding or blowout injuries of the face. ... Almost all the bone of her 
lower jaw was missing. The tongue was missing, a lot of its tissue and the 
muscles that are under the jaw. A lot of that tissue was absent." (Appellant's 
Brief, 32-33.) 
The State speculates "a legitimate reason is evident in the record" for 
trial counsel's inexplicable decision not to object to the gruesome testimony 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the medical examiner. (Appellant's Brief, 35-36.) The State believes trial 
counsel must have been so eager to exclude from evidence the gruesome 
photos of the victim that he was willing to allow the testimony excerpted 
above. But while trial counsel noted the information in the photos could be 
adduced by other testimony, he failed to add that he surely meant that 
testimony should be limited to other "relevant" information. Because, in the 
very next sentence in his motion, trial counsel also notes, "none of the 
information contained in the photos is disputed by the defendant." See 
Addendum C to Appellee's Brief (Motion and Memorandum). 
This is the crux of Appellant's argument that trial counsel was 
ineffective. Because he successfully precluded admission of the gruesome 
photos of the victim, it was ineffective not to also object to medical 
examiner testimony that was not relevant to the issue of intent. That 
Appellant caused the victim's death by shotgun blast was not at issue. 
Appellant freely admitted, to anyone who asked, that he shot the victim. He 
admitted it to the investigating officers, the prosecutor, and the jury. The 
medical examiner was properly able to testify about the relative positions of 
the victim and Appellant, and the proximity of the muzzle of the gun - three 
or four feet - to the victim. These allowed the jury to assess intent without 
the additional inflammatory information regarding the horrific nature of the 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
victim's wounds. That testimony could only serve to inflame the jury, 
producing in the jury a sense of horror which could only provoke the jury's 
instinct to punish. Not to object to the testimony of the medical examiner 
regarding the gruesome details of the victim's wounds, and to the use of the 
mannequin head as a prop, was not a reasonable defense strategy; as such, it 
was ineffective assistance. See, Appellant's Brief, 30-35. 
Finally, as more fully explained above, even if the marshaling 
requirement is not met, this court is not precluded from addressing the merits 
of an appellant's claims. See, Park City Mines. The procedural posture of 
this case makes it one in which justice demands this Court address, on the 
merits, Appellant's claims. 
II. APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS. 
During closing argument, Appellant preserved his claim that the 
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction by making it clear to the 
Court the evidence supported a charge of criminal homicide. However, there 
was no need for Appellant to preserve his claim that the evidence did not 
support the jury verdict because the policy reasons supporting the 
preservation doctrine are not present with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
claim. Finally, the trial court committed plain error in submitting this case to 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the jury, because the evidence in this case is insufficient to support 
Appellant's conviction, and the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider only a 
charge of negligent homicide. 
A. Appellant preserved his claim there is insufficient evidence to 
support his manslaughter conviction. 
During his closing argument, counsel for Appellant made clear to the 
court, and the jury, his argument that the evidence was insufficient to 
support anything other than the crime of negligent homicide. (Trial 
transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 107-109.) u[B]ecause of what I think the evidence 
shows is his criminal negligence in this case ... what we have here is a 
criminal negligent homicide causing the death of [the victim] by my client 
while he was acting in such a way that he ought to have been aware that he 
was putting her at substantial risk, unjustifiable risk." (Trial transcript, Vol. 
2, pp. 108-109.) This argument preserved Appellant's claim that the 
evidence was insufficient. 
B. The preservation doctrine should not apply to a sufficiency-of-the 
evidence claim. 
Contrary to the reasoning in State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 
2000), "[neither] of the ... policy reasons supporting the preservation 
doctrine is present with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim." State v. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 194 (Utah App. 2000). The preservation doctrine is 
designed to allow the trial court to address, and, if necessary, correct a 
claimed error. It is also designed to prevent parties from foregoing 
objections at trial as part of a strategy to enhance chances of acquittal, and 
failing acquittal, then asking an appellate court to reverse on the basis of the 
not-objected-to error. Id. As the Rudolph court notes, once a "jury renders a 
verdict, as a practical matter there is little, if anything, relative to the 
sufficiency of the evidence that can be corrected.'" Id. Further, because the 
standard of review on a post-trial motion regarding the adequacy of the 
evidence is the same as the standard of review applied by the appellate court, 
"nothing is lost by waiting until the appeal stage to challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence." Id. at 195. Waiting until an appeal to review insufficiency 
claims also has the advantage of not further burdening trial courts by 
exhausting the limited time and resources of trial courts." Id. Thus, 
"[ajlthough it is neither uncommon nor inappropriate to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a post-trial motion, such a 
challenge should not be a prerequisite to challenge the same on appeal." Id. 
atl96.2 
2
 Randolph was decided four months prior to Holgate, and its finding 
that the preservation rule does not apply to insufficiency claims is not 
addressed by the Holgate court. 
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C. Even if Appellant failed to preserve his insufficiency claim and 
this court finds the preservation doctrine applies to Appellant's 
claim, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the case to 
the jury on anything other than a charge of negligent homicide. 
Finally, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the case to the 
jury on anything other than a charge of criminal homicide, because to do so, 
the trial court to had to ignore the obvious and fundamental lack of evidence 
showing anything other than negligent behavior on the part of the Appellant. 
"The plain error exception [to the preservation doctrine] enables the 
appellate court to 'balance the need for procedural regularity with the 
demands of fairness/ " State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) 
(citation omitted) (wherein, the court found that the sufficiency of the 
evidence could be reviewed for plain error). 
"At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the appellate 
court] to avoid injustice." Id. (Citation omitted.) "To demonstrate plain 
error, a defendant must establish that '(0 [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the 
verdict is undermined." Id. (Citation omitted.) Appellant notes here that the 
conspicuous lack of evidence of recklessness was an error which should 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have been obvious to the court, and absent that error (i.e., absent submission 
of the murder and manslaughter instructions to the jury), Appellant would 
have obtained the more favorable outcome of conviction of negligent 
homicide. Thus, it was plain error to submit the case to the jury on anything 
other than the negligent homicide instruction. 
This Court should conclude "the evidence was insufficient when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he ... 
was convicted.' " Holgate, at 352. If this Court concludes the evidence is 
insufficient, it "must then ... determine whether the evidentiary defect was 
so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the 
jury." Id. 
Appellant's argument regarding the inconclusiveness of the evidence 
supporting a finding of recklessness, and why the evidentiary defects should 
have been obvious to the trial court is fully explained in his opening brief. A 
few salient points bear repeating: First, whether it seemed like it or not, 
Appellant was extremely intoxicated at the time of the shooting. His blood 
alcohol level could have been as high as .21 at the time of the shooting, three 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
times the presumptive limit for legally operating an automobile, and making 
it unlikely he could be aware of the risks he was taking with the gun. 
Second, Appellant called the shooting an accident, and never backed down 
from that stance, even though he emotionally took responsibility for the 
damage his negligence had wrought. And third, Appellant was highly 
distraught and remorseful after he had accidentally killed the victim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to 
reverse the jury's finding the Appellant was guilty of manslaughter. 
DATED this 25th day of August, 2011. 
Robert L. Donohoe 
Attorney for Appellant 
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